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BOOK REVIEW
JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: NEW TECHNIQUES AND
CONCEPTS. By Ann Fagan Ginger. Tiburon, California: Law-

press. 1975. Pp. xii + 728. Looseleaf. $35.00.
By Mary Timothy. Palo Alto: Emty Press. 1974.
Pp. 307. Softbound. $3.95.
Reviewed by Alan W. Scheflin*
JURY WOMAN.

The position of the jury in the Anglo-American system of
justice has always been precarious. Vituperatively attacked
and staunchly defended throughout its long history, the jury
today is no more secure for its longevity than it was in its
infancy eight centuries ago. Faced with a wide and sustained
barrage of criticism on several fronts, the jury method of adjudication is once again fighting for its life. The question of jury
unanimity, the issue of the proper size for juries, the debate
over who may properly voir dire the jury and what they may
legitimately ask, the controversy surrounding the right of the
jury to nullify the law and acquit in criminal cases on the basis
of mercy or conscience, and the concern over proper methods
for investigating prospective jurors and selecting jury panels,
all mark the terrain in which a major ideological struggle, with
enormous practical repercussions, is being waged. A decade of
political trials and intensified public interest in the workings
of the legal system have further contributed to the presence of
the jury on the center stage of popular attention. It is therefore
not surprising to see an increase in the number of books and
articles exploring the composition and operation of the jury.
These two books are illustrative of that trend.
Whether out of reverence, ignorance, or scorn, most Americans have traditionally been content to leave the development
of law and the management of the legal system to a small core
of highly educated and professionally trained lawyers and
judges. Jury service, once respected as a special honor, is now
more often viewed as a mere annoyance. The first reaction to
a summons for jury services is all too often, "Can I get out of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; B.A., 1963,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1966, George Washington University Law School; LL.M.,
1967, Harvard Law School; admitted to practice in District of Columbia, 1967.
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it?" and, sadly, a substantial number of citizens have little
trouble in doing so. When Congress passed the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968,' it greatly extended the franchise
so that hitherto excluded groups suddenly found themsleves
invited to participate in a legal system that had largely ignored
them before. The inclusion in the processes of justice of the
widest array of citizens in this nation's history has produced a
revitalized interest in the role of the jury in the legal system.
A new generation of proponents and antagonists has arisen to
once again debate the relative merits of lay participation in the
administration of law.
The two books reviewed here support the jury in its traditional form. Jury Selection in CriminalTrials is a defense manual for jury advocacy, while Jury Woman is a narrative relating
the virtues of jury service from the perspective of the juror.
Both books are of vital interest to those who are concerned with
the role of the jury.
JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

Jury Selection in Criminal Trials is a successor volume to
Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials,2 a book exploring Charles
Garry's brilliant voir dire in the Huey Newton case. But the
new book is broader in scope and offers deeper coverage than
its predecessor. Chapters include discussions of the history and
function of grand and petit juries, change of venue procedures,
challenges to the jury array, investigating the jury panel, exercising peremptory challenges, implementing effective voir dire
questioning, and the jury as the conscience of the community.
Openly and unashamedly a pro-defense manual for trial strategies, it characterizes recent attempts to weaken the effectiveness of juries (by cutting their size and stripping them of the
requirement of unanimity) as political acts designed not
merely to streamline the legal process, but more surreptiously
to shift control of the mechanism of justice from the people to
the government. Because the jury enshrines self-rule, Professor
Ginger considers any weakening of the jury to be an assault on
one of the central pillars of democracy; she therefore mounts a
massive defense of the jury institution and seeks to provide to
defense counsel a manual to aid them in supporting and protecting as strong a jury system as possible.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1969).
2. National Laywers Guild (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
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One manifestation of this political bias in favor of juries
is the author's extensive use of documents filed in political
cases. Indeed, one of the chief virtues and unique distinctions
of Jury Selection in Criminal Trials is its presentation of material not often found in other texts. Excerpted portions of the
following types of material appear throughout the book: personal comments and speeches by leading defense attorneys,
briefs, oral arguments, congressional testimony or commentary, affidavits, unreported opinions and judicial orders, motions and memoranda, points and authorities, courtroom testimony, direct examination, petitions for certiorari and prospective jury questionnaires. Each chapter, and each section of
each chapter, contains discussion and selective citation to leading authorities and commentaries. But the real highlight is the
inclusion of the above listed material which is simply unavailable elsewhere. This material both furthers the author's pro-jury
argument and provides useful forms which practitioners may
borrow in preparing their own jury challenges or arguments.
The presentation of affidavits from experts, for example, presents a lay viewpoint that attorneys might otherwise be apt to
overlook. At the same time it provides instruction on how to
structure expert testimony and how best to utilize it.'
Extensive illustrations of voir dire techniques reveal the
extent to which lawyers have rarified and creatively embellished what was once a brash and unsophisticated procedure.
For sheer entertainment value alone, the excerpts from the
"masters" of voir dire are a microcosmic illumination of the
psychology of the mind. To say that these chapters are entertaining should not be taken in any way as a disparagement of
the hard work and creative genius, as well as the serious purpose and humane instincts, that fashioned the author's end
product. The voir dire experts we encounter in Jury Selection
are not trying to entertain us. But the skill with which they
have done their job can be appreciated on an aesthetic as well
as a practical level.
Perhaps none of the subjects dealt with in this book are as
controversial as the use of social scientists and other consultants to aid in jury selection. 4 The notoriety given to these new
3. A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 300, 307, 309-11, 320-26 (1975)
Ihereinafter cited as GINGER] (illustrations of effective use of expert opinion and
testimony).
4. Valuable references not cited in GINGER include: W. BRYAN, JR., THE CHOSEN
ONES (1971); Bermant, The Notion of Conspiracy Is Not Tasty to Americans,
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techniques, and their apparent success,' have aroused strong
response from experienced trial observers and participants.
Several chapters are devoted to this explosive issue. The book
presents a careful discussion of how the techniques work, and
forms are reprinted for collating and tabulating the massive
data which needs to be accumulated and analyzed.
The new science of jury selection is still in its infancy. Yet
it has been used in the trials of the Harrisburg 7, the Camden
28, the Gainesville 8, the Wounded Knee defendants, Angela
Davis, Mitchell-Stans, Joanne Little, Steven Soliah, and
Ellsberg-Russo. In no case was a defendant convicted. All rePSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May, 1973 at 60; Brams & Davis, A Game-Theory Approach to
Jury Selection, TRIAL, Dec., 1976, at 47; D'Agostini & Brown, Loaded For
Acquittal?-Psychiatryin the Jury Selection Process, 7 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 199 (1975);
Moore, Jr., Redressing the Balance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec., 1974, at 29; Robinson, How
Psychology Helped Free Angela, EBONY, Feb., 1973, at 44; Sage, Psychology and the
Angela Davis Jury, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Jan., 1973, at 56; Schulman, et al., Recipe for a
Jury, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May, 1973, at 37; Weider, Juries on Trial, HARPER'S WEEKLY,
June 28, 1976, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Weider]; Zeisel & Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1 A.B.F. RES. J. 151 (1976); Christie,
Finding a Friendly Jury, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1974, at 49; Defending Joanne Little,
NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1975, at 34; Judging Jurors,TIME, Jan. 28, 1974, at 60; Anspacher,
Angela's Statisticians, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 4, 1972, at 6; Smith, Jury Sleuthing Gets
Its Day in Court, S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 28, 1976, at 4; Wright, Angela's Psych Squad,
S.F. Examiner & Chronicle, May 27, 1973, § A, at 17; Roger Gould & Renee Gould,
Jury Selection: Pentagon Papers Trial (unpublished, undated draft) [on file at SANTA
CLARA L. REV.].
Special mention should be made of the excellent manual prepared by the National
Jury Project and the National Lawyers Guild entitled THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS

FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE (Kairys ed. 1975).

5. It is difficult to assess the success of these social science techniques. While it
is true that defendants who have availed themselves of scientific consultants have
fared very well, other factors may have been the cause. For example, a Department of
Justice report evaluated the reasons for acquittals in major political cases and concluded that the results stem in part from the fact that the cases
were tried before juries at least partially composed of people willing to
be convinced of government misconduct, or willing to believe the exculpatory motives alleged by the defense. The defense sought, and was able
to evoke, the sense that the government used the legal system to legitimize or enforce unpopular policies or decisions.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DISRUPTION IN THE COURTROOM AND THE PUBLICLY CONTROVERSIAL DEFENDANT, April 18, 1975, at 10 [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].

Interviews with jurors after acquittal verdicts often revealed the view that the
government case was very weak. Perhaps social scientists were able to detect jurors
who would come to this view. But one commentator has noted that the scientific record
is far from unblemished. A woman picked by the defense team in the Soliah case as
weak and a follower, was selected as the jury foreperson. The two jurors who voted for
convictions and hung the jury in the Harrisburg 7 trial were picked as "good jurors,"
and the juror who persuaded the 8 jurors who initially voted for conviction in the
Mitchell-Stans trial to change their votes to not guilty did not fit into the defense
profile as a "good juror." Weider, supra note 4, at 9.
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sulted in acquittals except the Harrisburg case (which hung 102 in favor of acquittal) and the Ellsberg-Russo case (which was

dismissed before the case was sent to the jury).6 A wide variety
of experts, including social psychologists, sociologists, statisticians, computer programmers, body linguists (kinesiologists),
behavioral scientists, psychiatrists, hypnotists, astrologers,
handwriting analysts, specialists in small group dynamics and
media analysts, have lent their special skills to defense efforts
to secure the most favorable jury possible. This new technique
is a far cry from the folklore, superstition, intuition and lay
psychology that lawyers have traditionally used to select jurors. It seeks to replace intuition with information, superstition with statistics, and folklore with facts.
Although several models exist, the basic procedure for scientific jury selection consists of a three step process. The first
step involves obtaining demographic and interview-derived
data to ascertain behavioral profiles of the venue site of the
trial. Attitude surveys, demographic statistics, voting patterns,
political and religious affiliations, occupations, national origins
and other significant information is compiled to construct a
picture of the potential jury population of that community.
Profiles of juror characteristics are then developed and rated as
to desirability. From these figures voir dire questions are fashioned to reveal hidden biases or attitudes.
The second phase is in-court observation of the voir dire.
Body movements, verbal and nonverbal responses, patterns of
dress and speech, attentiveness, suggestibility, deference to
authority, ease of communication, and other information is
6. After the dismissal of the Ellsberg case, most members of the jury convened
for a session with Roger Gould, a U.C.L.A. Medical School psychiatrist aiding the
defense; Martin Levine, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California; and
author Peter Schrag. A transcript of the meeting demonstrates substantial sympathy
for the defendants and the belief that the government evidence was insufficient. Unfortunately, the transcript has not been published.
7. Under the old learning:
butchers and barbers will be bloodthirsty; carpenters and accountants
too meticulous; don't let small businessmen near a robbery trial; get a
Jew or other racial minority for sympathy; engineers are coldblooded;
avoid intellectuals unless the defense is insanity; no sick, crippled, or
otherwise stigmatized persons, since punishment loves company; stay
clear of persons having anything to do with education, this being no time
to be taught a lesson; beware of the potential juror who has had unpleasant encounters with the law. He may be anti-system and disposed toward
you, or having paid his dues he may be determined that you won't avoid
yours.
Weider, supra note 4, at 8.
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compiled on each potential juror and matched with any third
party information available about each person. The third step
involves the tabulation of this information into a decision
about each prospective juror. As the jury panel begins to fill up,
different characteristics for the remaining jurors may be
sought. Jurors are measured not only against how they might
vote for the defendant, but also against how they will interact
with each other. The intended result: an acquittal-prone jury.
Sharp criticism has resulted from this marriage of science
and the law in the process of jury selection. Arguing that the
impartiality of juries is threatened by these procedures, which
are ostensibly designed to produce "stacked" or "rigged" juries, some social scientists have urged that drastic measures be
taken to curtail further use of these "jury rigging" techniques.
Amitai Etzioni, chairman of the Department of Sociology at
Columbia University, the most vocal opponent of the new science,' envisions the techniques being used by the government
on a far wider scale than individual defendants could match
(unless they were wealthy) and the whole trial process being
turned from a search for truth into a conflict between computers. He favors reducing the number of peremptory challenges
available to each side, an extension of the ban on jury tampering to include out-of-court investigations, and removal of lawyer voir dire so that only the judge may question potential
jurors.
Proponents of the new methods of jury selection argue in
response that these techniques are necessary to correct the
imbalance that already exists between the government and the
defendant. According to Howard Moore, Jr., chief defense attorney in the Angela Davis case (where these methods were
used), "juries are already stacked-against blacks, chicanos,
orientals, and the poor." 9 Moore argues that social scientists
are necessary to the defense "not to slant juries, but to correct
the prejudice which already exists."' 0 Using the Davis case as
an illustration, Moore cites statistics showing that the chance
of Ms. Davis receiving a jury of her ethnic and socio-economic
peers in Santa Clara County was minimal. In addition, public
surveys demonstrated that one out of three persons held an
unfavorable attitude towards Ms. Davis. Under those circum8. Creating An Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov./Dec., 1974, at 28.
9. Moore, Redressing the Balance, TRIAL, Nov./Dec., 1974, at 29.
10. Id.
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stances, the defense was not looking for an acquittal-oriented
jury as much as it was looking for "jurors whose attitudes and
personality characteristics indicated openness and an ability to
listen to both sides and arrive at a rational decision based upon
the evidence or lack of evidence.""
Ginger accepts the argument that scientific jury selection
is necessary to protect against the greater resources available
to the government. She argues that the government has already accumulated the same kind of information which the
defense is now seeking to compile.' 3 Without the new jury selection methodology, the government's advantage would be nearly
insuperable. Nevertheless, she cautions that juror privacy must
be respected as fully as possible and notes that the type of
information which defense strategists seek is more objective
than personal.
The real threat, however, is ignored by Ginger. To the
extent that the new techniques continue to arouse displeasure,
especially among judicial and government officials, their very
success may lead to the downfall of the jury. Especially at a
time when the jury system is undergoing careful scrutiny and
extensive revision, the argument that these new methods produce stacked and unfair juries may be precisely the ammunition necessary for a call for the jury's total abolition. After all,
if the defense can pick a biased jury, the whole point of trial
by jury is eliminated;' 4 cases would depend more upon persons
than proof. The rules of evidence would be less important than
the principles of personality analysis. The trial would be an
anti-climatic afterthought to the drama of jury selection.' Proposals for elimination of the jury already exist in the legal
literature 6 and the new liaison between science and lawyers in
selecting defense-oriented jurors could well add further fuel to
those simmering fires of discontent. The failure of Ginger to
11.

Id. at 35.
GINGER, supra note 3, at 332-34.
13. Id. at 364.
Book Review, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1936).
Morgan,
14.
15. See
The
story is
told of an English barrister and an American trial
lawyer who were discussing their respective court proceedings. The American asked the barrister when a trial began under the English system.
"When the jury is accepted by counsel and sworn to try the issues," he
replied. "Hell," said the American, "in the United States the trial is over
by that time."
Atkins, Jury Voir Dire by Counsel-Let's Preserve It, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 689 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Kessler, The Crime Crisis and ProposedProceduralReform, 5 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 1,22-32 (1972).

12.
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recognize this threat is a serious defect, which is especially sad
since the very thrust of her pro-techniques argument could,
ironically, lead to the destruction of the very institution she is
trying to preserve.
Other troublesome aspects of Jury Selection in Criminal
Trials might also be mentioned. I have already pointed out the
very heavy pro-defense bias of the book. While this bias ignites
the book with passion and drive, making it alive and scintillating to read, it also leaves the reader with the impression that
much is missing. It soon becomes clear that the absence of
balance and extended scholarship hurts the book. The reader
will not find all the necessary arguments, nor even all the law,
in it. Much that would be essential to present a successful jury
argument will have to be sought elsewhere. Most topics are at
least superficially touched upon with supporting citation, but
more should be expected and more could have been delivered. 7
Perhaps these deficiencies are the inevitable by-product of the
book's exciting, pro-jury vision.
While most of the chapters give a basic indication of the
jury arguments being considered, such is not the case with the
chapter on jury nullification. The right to have the jury instructed that it may acquit the defendant for reasons of conscience or mercy-even though the defendant may be technically
guilty under the facts and the judge's instructions on the
law-has been a mainstay of virtually every political trial
argued in the last decade. Defense lawyers have labored,
largely unsuccessfully, to prevail on this issue. The superficial
presentation given in Jury Selection in Criminal Trials to this
important argument cannot adquately inform concerned counsel about its meaning. The reader who is not already familiar
with the nullification argument is apt to be confused, and perhaps even misinformed, after reading the book's scanty discussion of this issue." Because nullification is a central, indeed
vital, concept for the political meaning of the jury to Ginger,
it is tragic that she did not give it the treatment it deserves.
17. However, help is on the way. Professor Jon Van Dyke has written a book
which supplies much of this information. His book serves as a fine companion volume
to Professor Ginger's work. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977).
18. GINGER, supra note 3, at 674. Fortunately, there are law review articles which
may be consulted for guidance. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 582 (1939); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.

168 (1972); Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Current
Controversy, to be published in 1977.
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More than any other issue in Jury Selection in Criminal Trials,
nullification most closely identifies the jury with the people's
sovereignty; the people's power over law. One would expect
this chapter to be the book's best rather than its worst.
This criticism is symptomatic of the design of Jury Selection in Criminal Trials. Adopting the posture of a how-to-do-it
manual for defense lawyers, and figuring that the way to do it
is by following what others have done before, the book often
opts for reproduction of a form or document, without more,
where it might have been better to articulate the competing
arguments. In the chapter on jury nullification, for instance,
the reader is not given sufficient historical background from
which the genesis of the nullification argument is derived. Nor
is the reader presented with the major arguments supporting
the right, the reasoning that courts and commentators have
used to refuse it, and the answers to these arguments that have
been raised by supporters. In short, while nullification is still
an ongoing debate,"9 the reader is treated to no more than a
skimpy presentation of one side. An objective evaluation under
such circumstances by a concerned reader with an open mind
would be simply impossible. Throughout much of the book,
and especially in the last chapter, the reader has to know much
already in order to appreciate what is being offered.
In spite of its defects, Jury Selection in Criminal Trials is
a fascinating book. What it lacks in scholarship it more than
makes up for in dedication. The jury has always inspired wonder and excitement, even in those critics bent on terminating
its existence or tarnishing its image. Jury stories are good stories and lawyers and laypersons alike delight in sharing them
with others. But Jury Selection in Criminal Trials is intriguing
not simply because it concerns a fascinating subject. Many
words have been written about juries, about how they function,
and about those who sit on them, without being interesting, let
alone fascinating. Ann Ginger's book is compelling because it
is a human book, a rewarding chronicle of the energies, ideas,
talents and turmoils of many men and women who labored,
lovingly, to make the jury dream a routine practice. Their dedication to the law as the people's tool for self-rule, and to the
jury as the only institution capable of guaranteeing that all of
the people, and not just a select elite few, are counted, brought
before the legal forum and the public arena the central ques19.

See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tions of democracy, asking a nation to respect its heritage, obey
its laws and be true to its ideals. Such dedication seeks to make
the vision of the jury as expressed by Justice White a reality:
The guarantees of the jury trial in the Federal and State
Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way
in which law should be enforced and justice administered.
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in
order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who
wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge. If the
defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction
of a single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury
trial provision in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State
and Federal Government in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury
trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary
law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must
therefore be respected by the States. 0
JURY WOMAN

Books about the jury written by former jurors are often the
most enjoyable, and Jury Woman by Mary Timothy, the jury
foreperson in the Angela Davis trial, is no exception. It is filled
with enough warmth and confusion, anger and concern, humor
and judgment to be both entertaining and enlightening. Who
can fail to be amused at her description of the prospective
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
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jurors in the assembly room listening to instructions over a
closed circuit television set: "This was really a strange scene:
a room full of people pledging to uphold the law of the land and
the rules of the court-to a TV set."'" And who cannot feel her
concern when she discovered that other jurors shared her experience of having difficulty with their home telephones and suspecting that their lines had been tapped.22 An FBI visit to her
son's apartment on the pretext of having information that a
draft evader was living there, coupled with a thorough search
of the premises, produced in her mind the reaction that "they
were sending me a message. They were telling me that my
children were vulnerable." 2 3
We can sympathize with Mary Timothy's uneasiness
about whether she could go to a peace march to demonstrate
against the bombing of North Vietnam while sitting as a juror.
She went.24 And we can certainly share some of her exhilaration
at finally being able to communicate her impressions of the
trial to someone else:
We all wanted to talk. We were the only people in the
world who hadn't been able to discuss the case or even
mention it casually. Now we finally were given a chance
to start saying some of the things that we had kept bottled
up for all these weeks.25
Mary Timothy's description of her own involvement in the
process that eventually led to Angela Davis's acquittal highlights one often overlooked virtue of jury service. As explained
by a former juror writing in the Los Angeles Times several years
ago:
Jury service has changed me in another way; I've
learned to know myself better. It starts the first time you
go into a courtroom and the voir dire starts.
You become aware of your own prejudices when you're
asked if you're prejudiced against people who drink.
21. M. TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TIMOTHY].
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id. at 122. Jurors in other cases have had similar suspicions of improper
governmental interference with the sanctity of the jury. In the Chicago Conspiracy
Trial, a juror believed to be pro-defense received a threatening letter allegedly sent by
the Black Panthers. The letter was read to her by the judge. She asked to be excused
and was replaced by an alternate who other jurors felt was a government agent. See
SCHULTZ, MOTION WILL BE DENIED: A REPORT ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL 328342 (1972).
24. TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 149-50.
25. Id. at 247.
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Against Arabs. Against police officers. Against people who
aren't citizens. Against people whose life-style is different
from yours. Against whatever."
Timothy describes her own shock at discovering that she had
not been paying close enough attention to the presentation of
the case at one point:
The witness had carelessly stated something that was obviously in error and I hadn't even noticed! I was going to
have to get to work. I couldn't just sit there and listen
politely to the stories of the witnesses. I was going to have
to question and analyze and worry about each statement.27
She could no longer take the process for granted. She had become involved. Learning about both herself and the law, jury
service turned Mary Timothy from a complacent citizen into a
concerned citizen.
One measure of her increased involvement in the trial process is the unique role she played in the acquittal verdict. As
the time approached for the jury to retire and deliberate, she
realized that she had no real idea of how those deliberations
should take place. A trip to the local library produced several
books written by lawyers or judges about the jury but none
from the perspective of how juries deliberated. None had the
special insight available only to those who had been through
the process themselves. Finally, she found Godfrey Lehman's
What You Need to Know for Jury Duty, a book written by a
former juror about the step by step aspects of jury service.
Containing extensive discussion of the process of jury deliberations, it provided advice which was to prove instrumental in
the Davis case.
Lehman, departing from the usual practice, urges that the
jurors not take an initial vote to determine where they stand.
Lehman argues that the initial vote is destructive because if it
is unanimous, the jury will forego the opportunity to discuss
the case, and if it is divided, the jurors will feel committed to
defend their vote. In both instances the opportunity to discuss
the case with an open mind is lost."
26. Murphy, Six Weeks That Shook Her World, L.A. Times, July 9, 1972, § E
at 1, 17 [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
27. TiMOTHY, supra note 21, at 113.
28. Lehman argues:
Never start by taking a ballot on the verdict! You might believe that an
immediate ballot will teach you how the jury stands, and that, if you are
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Timothy was impressed with this advice and urged it upon
her fellow jurors. She explained to them that taking an initial
vote might "tend to cause people to argue rather than discuss;
29
it could polarize people and possibly result in a hung jury.
Timothy credits the advice given by Lehman with permitting
a free flow of ideas and opinions in the Davis deliberations.
A further piece of information about those deliberations is
instructive for lawyers. Timothy realized that the order of deliberations could affect their outcome. One juror, leaning tounanimous, there's no need for any discussion at all, and you've saved
all that time.
The dangers are many. When you ask for a ballot as the first order
of business, one or more jurors may feel pressured to cast his vote despite
serious doubts. If it is unanimous and deliberations are closed immediately, these doubts are never resolved. Such a juror may be too timid to
ask for a reconsideration.
Often a juror who has committed himself, even tentatively, may find
it difficult to switch in the mistaken idea that to change his mind implies
weakness, vacillation, or even stupidity. Further, a divided vote imposes
upon the minority a three-horned dilemma: the greater burden of convincing the majority, rarely accomplished; the embarrassment of switching; or the potential disgrace of forcing a hung jury.
Still more important, as soon as you take your first ballot you divide
yourselves into two opposing camps and introduce the irrelevance of antagonism; you are drawn into defending your respective positions rather
than being left free to consider the evidence and testimony objectively.
But the most important reason for not voting at the start is that you
have not reviewed the case or the evidence. While you may have been
doing a lot of thinking about the case, you probably have not thought of
everything. When you share your thoughts with the other jurors, almost
undoubtedly you will be reminded of significant evidence you had forgotten and which may change you entire opinion. This will be true of almost
every juror, whose memory will have played varying tricks on his recollections of the trial.
Many juries begin by asking each member around the table to express a preliminary opinion and to give his reasons. This has the identical
effect of voting secretly, except it is much stronger. Each juror is
committing himself firmly and publicly to a position without having
reviewed the total evidence.
And when you've gone around the table, what do you do then? One
juror has presented one set of reasons for voting "guilty" or "liable"; a
second has supported his "not guilty" or "not liable" stand for an unrelated set of reasons. You are now enmeshed in a controversy not connected with the evidence because, if you are to reach a verdict, one or
more jurors must be willing to switch from the position he has taken.
Thus it is important that none of your opening actions force any juror
to a commitment of any kind. The foreman should make this clear immediately, and no juror should express, even to the fellow next to him, his
position on what the verdict should be, no matter how strongly he may
feel.
LEHMAN, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW FOR JURY DUTY 40-41 (1968).
29. TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 240.
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wards conviction, wanted to start with the kidnap-murder
charges. Timothy objected, preferring to begin with the conspiracy charge. She felt that if the kidnap-murder charges
opened the discussion, substantial testimony about "the guns
and the bullets, and all the testimony of the police witnesses
and the hostages would have to be considered"3 and this would
inure to the detriment of Ms. Davis. So the jury began with the
conspiracy charge and quickly disposed of it; the rest of the
charges fell for lack of support. Had the jurors begun their
deliberations with the kidnap-murder charges, the ultimate
verdict might have been quite different. Although presented to
the reader simply as a factual description of jury deliberation,
this information is of great significance to attorneys.
There are other lessons attorneys may learn from Jury
Woman. For example, when the prosecution witnesses described how many "rounds" of ammunition they discovered,
the defense never clarified to the jury that a "round" is a single
bullet. Timothy notes that when this point was discussed in the
jury room, many of the jurors thought that a "round" of ammunition was a large quantity and not just a single bullet." The
defense had unknowingly allowed the prosecution to create an
image contrary to fact, thereby strengthening its case.
The major thrust of Timothy's book is that jurors do not
fully know their proper role so they seek guidance from experienced courtroom participants. The attorney who carefully tries
to ease the confusion of the jurors by pointing out aids to them
in performing a function they do not fully comprehend will win
their support. But the attorney who leaves the jury to struggle
with its own conception of what it is doing is inviting his or her
adversary to obtain an advantage by providing this guidance.
What separates Jury Woman from other books written by
former jurors is its plea for a Juror's Bill of Rights. The problem, according to Timothy, is that jurors do not know what is
expected of them. Although jurors are told their duties, they
are not told their rights. Could they take notes? One of them
did and concluded that it was permissible because no objection
was made."2 But no one had encouraged or authorized them
to do so. Could they ask questions during the trial? When
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 241.
Id.at 97.
Id.at 143.
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one juror tried to do so he was rebuked by the judge." According to Timothy:
We were not informed as to what actions on our part would
lead to our dismissal from the jury, or cause a mistrial. Not
knowing the limits put a lot of pressures on us. Everyone
else in the courtroom knew his or her job. They knew what
they were doing-everyone except us. We were overwhelmed. We tried to conform and adjust and be perfect
jurors, perfect people."4
Timothy proposes a Bill of Rights for Jurors as a solution.3"
Jurors, she believes, have a right to be fully informed of the
rules before the trial begins. They have the right to be told
whether or not they may ask questions, take notes, request a
review of testimony, ignore prejudicial attitudes or opinions or
rulings by the judge, or engage in whatever form of behavior he
or she desires outside the courtroom. Such information, along
with a statement of jury duties, should be available in a jury
handbook.
Timothy's plea for jurors also includes the right to adequate financial compensation and for protection from threats
in high tension cases. More controversial is Timothy's proposal
that jurors have a right to have "members of minorities included on the jury."" In the Angela Davis case, the jury was
"all-white, middle-class, middle-income" 37 and this hampered
dealing with the special problems of minority defendants. Timothy criticizes the prosecution practice of removing minority
jurors with peremptory challenges, considering this a violation
of the civil rights of the jury. Our legal system has not yet
reached the point where it is ready to recognize the legal status
of the jury as a plaintiff, but if the concept of legal standing
for trees" can receive a sympathetic ear on the Supreme
Court," perhaps the day will not be too far off when the jury
will be allowed to sue on its own behalf.
One such suit might be based on Timothy's claim that
jurors are entitled, as fully as other citizens, to a right of pri33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 301-07.

36. Id. at 304.
37. Id.
38. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights For Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
39. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting
opinion).
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vacy.11 For example, Timothy urges that each juror be voir
dired in private. According to Timothy, there would be a
"double advantage: the personal privacy of the individual
would be protected and the juror being questioned would feel
freer to disclose any problems he or she might have." 41 Such
voir dire should be conducted by attorneys and not solely by
the judge. Timothy believes that attorneys are more successful
than judges in detecting and disclosing subtle biases.42 An illustration during the voir dire in the Davis case makes her point.
One of the defense counsel, while questioning a prospective
juror, received a response that it would be difficult for that
juror to be objective in judging a defendant with communistleanings. Defense counsel requested removal for cause, but the
judge took over the questioning "and by rephrasing it made it
possible for [the prospective juror] to reply that yes, indeed,
he could be a fair juror. So he was left on the jury."43
The other aspect of privacy greatly in need of protection,
according to Timothy, is the personal lives of the jurors.
"Jurors," she says, "have a right to be free from investigation
of their private lives." 4 Pointing to the trend to hire psycholo40. See Maxwell, The Case of the Rebellious Juror,56 A.B.A.J. 838 (1970) (winner of the 1970 Ross essay competition).
41. TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 306.
42. For an excellent article on this subject see Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972).
43. TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 43.
44. Id. at 306. Present law permits investigation of jurors by government and
defense counsel provided that such investigation does not invade the privacy of the
juror, involve jury tampering or constitute an obstruction of justice. See Annot., 20
A.L.R. Fed. 731 (1974). Without a showing of intimidation or an attempt to influence
the juror in a specific case, a violation of the law would be difficult to prove. Mere
information gathering is perfectly legal. The right of the juror to privacy is no greater
than the rijht of any citizen to privacy and courts have permitted extensive investigations of prospective jurors. See Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact
on the Decisional Process, 56 GEo. L.J. 839 (1968); Editor's Page, 57 GEO. L.J. 461
(1969). In many large cities, private detective firms routinely investigate potential
jurors and sell the information to major law firms. See Belli, Forward to W. BRYAN,
THE CHOSEN ONES at x (1971) (analogizing these jury services to "handicapping" guides
at racetracks, aiding the major law firms in predicting how "a juror will 'run.' ").
Okun delineates the power of the jury to nullify the law as an important and
special function which should be exercised when the jury adequately reflects a crosssection of the community. Once the jury represents this cross-section, their overriding of the legislative will more closely mirrors community sentiment. Okun, supra at
844. The practice of obtaining pre-trial information on jurors interferes with the obtaining of representative juries, in Okun's opinion, because such information is used
by counsel to select jurors biased in their favor rather than jurors reflecting the composition of the community. Okun, supra at 878. Okun, therefore, favors a reduction in
the level of permissible data-gathering on potential or actual jurors. Unfortunately, he
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gists, sociologists, statisticians and other defense consultants,
Timothy fears that the apparent success of these new techniques will hurt the image of the jury and threaten the citizens
who compose it. In a highly significant passage she observes:
The government, losing so many of these politically important cases, is bound to blame the juries rather than the
inadequacy of its own cases and so will be forced to expand
the already formidable investigations of prospective jurors.
Historically, government agencies move slowly; therefore, these investigations would have to be done, not immediately before each trial, but on all citizens on the jury
lists, so as to be properly prepared.
Thus, in an effort towards more sophisticated jury selecting, dosiers [sic] would need to be compiled on all
citizens and kept up to date.
And the jury system, devised as a fortification of democracy, would lead us to a police state!45
CONCLUSION

Mary Timothy's position stands in direct contrast to that
of Professor Ginger. Both are ardent supporters of the jury
system, yet each draws different conclusions about the value
and meaning of intensive social science input into the jury selection process. Other issues often reveal divisions between
those who support the jury system and those who do not, but
here is an issue that divides jury supporters. It is, for this very
reason, perhaps the most significant concern about the jury
today. Professor Ginger, an academic, and Mary Timothy, a
juror, have drawn the lines of confrontation. Timothy's challenge is that what may be good for the defense will be better
for the government, and Ginger's response is that what is
does not detail how he would limit such investigations.
Another solution to the increasing investigation of jurors is suggested in Note, The
Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
597 (1976). The author proposes to expand discovery rules to permit the government

and the defense in criminal cases to obtain the information on jurors each has compiled. The discovery order would exclude work-product based upon interpretation or
evaluation of the information. It would only permit discovery of the raw data. Present
law generally does not permit discovery of jury investigation material.
Attempting to protect the defendant's constitutional right in criminal cases to an
"impartial jury" and the right of potential jurors to be free from intrusive and extensive incursions into their private lives will require some deft balancing by the courts.
The value of Mary Timothy's articulation of a Juror's Bill of Rights is that it encourages us to start thinking about this problem now.
45. TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 307.
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essential for the defense must be protected from the government. Ginger is willing to risk the possibility of increased governmental data gathering in order to protect political defendants from unfair or unjust criminal charges; the immediate
threat outweighs the possible potential one. Both authors
fear that the jury will become, as it has been before upon occasion, a subservient tool for an overly powerful government.
Timothy is afraid that the government will be able to control
juries through excess information about jurors, and Ginger
fears that government will control juries through insufficient
information available to the defense.
Whether either is right, and if so, which one, awaits the
judgment of the future. Social science expertise in the jury
selection process for the present remains an expensive luxury
that few can afford. Yet it has produced impressive results, if
acquittals in cases as disparate as the Camden 28 and the
Stans-Mitchell trial are any guide." Hailed by some as an*essential tool to weed out prejudice, and condemned by others
as a sure method to secure it, contemporary jury selection
techniques will most certainly become even more refined. As
an exciting frontier for the social sciences, current indications
point to increased involvement by sociologists and psychologists in the legal process. When the novelty wears off, however,
we may very well conclude that all the graphs, charts, statistics
and analyses were scarcely an improvement on the lawyer's
traditional guide-the hunch." When that happens, we may
return to the fundamental point made time and time again by
46. But see note 5, supra (on the difficulty of crediting acquittals to social science
jury selection).
47. Some contemporary evidence supports this view. In a study conducted by
social psychologist Shari Seidman Diamond and jury expert Hans Zeisel, both defense
lawyers and prosecutors proved highly successful in eliminating unsympathetic jurors.
Horn, Relax: Lawyers Have Done It for Years, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May, 1975, at 63.
The study compared juries selected by counsel after peremptory challenges with experimental juries randomly selected without challenges. The former acquitted in half the
cases, whereas the latter convicted in all cases. The study did not compare juries
selected with aid from social scientists against juries selected by attorneys without
such aid, however.
Richard Christie, one of the leaders in the application of social science techniques
to jury selection, has observed "There isn't a sociologist or psychologist around who
can beat a good trial lawyer at jury selection. The trouble is, there aren't that many
good trial lawyers around." Christie, Finding a Friendly Jury, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26,
1974, at 49.
Michael Saks has suggested that if lawyers wanted to have a greater influence over
the outcome of trials, they would be better off using social scientists to "help build
and structure the evidence to be presented" because "if there is anything social psychologists know about, it is the process of persuasion.
... Saks, Social Scientists
Can't Rig Juries, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan., 1976, at 48, 57.
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jurors: jury service changes a person. As one juror stated, "Jury
duty has given me a new respect for the law. . . . For the most
part, jurors become almost fanatic in trying to be fair-I think
it's the aura of the courtroom." 4 In Mary Timothy's own
words, "Yet we who have served on juries have found it to be
an experience which often makes us become strong defenders
of this sytem of jurisprudence which allows a citizen to sit in
judgment."4 9
The jury reflects the law's basic trust in people. That's the
message which comes across clearly in these two books. It may
be an imprecise method to make vital decisions. It may make
mistakes. It may cause some confusion and uncertainty. It may
be unpredictable. But it is a human institution. The support
for the jury expressed by these two authors is not misplaced.
Their books contribute useful knowledge about the workings of
the jury and treat that august institution with awe and respect.
At the close of the Angela Davis trial, after the jury returned
its verdict, the judge thanked the jury and read to them a
passage from G.K. Chesterton's Tremendous Trifles. The passage sums up the special attraction of the jury expressed in
these two books:
Our civilisation has decided, and very justly decided, that
determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too
important to be trusted to trained men.
If it wishes for light upon that awful matter, it asks
men who know no more law than I know, but who can feel
the things I felt in the jury box. When it wants a library
catalogued or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of
that kind, it uses.its specialists. But when it wishes anything done that is really serious, it collects twelve of the
ordinary men standing about. The same thing was done,
if I remember right, by the founder of Christianity.0
48.
49.
50.

Murphy, supra note 26, § E, at 1.
TIMOTHY, supra note 21, at 302.

Id. at 292.

